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I. INTRODUCTION
In Consentability, Nancy Kim tackles the difficult question of
why we permit people to consent to some activities but not others,
and where the line should be drawn.1 The guiding principle, rooted
in John Stuart Mill's Harm Principle, favors freedom from
government intervention-adults should be allowed to consent to
risky activities or transactions, so long as there are no negative
impacts on others.2 In particular, the law should not intrude on
personal choices that entail financial risks or risk of injury. But
this anti-paternalism stricture is violated in practice, often for
understandable reasons.3 If a judge orders that a suicidal college
student be deprived of his gun, most people would endorse this
imposition on his freedom.4 But in other cases there is no
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1. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS (2019).
2. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859) ("The only purpose for which power
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will,
is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient
warrant.").
3. Philosophers divide sharply on whether governmental paternalism can be
justified, with many believing that such interventions are defensible if the restraints
on individual autonomy are sufficiently small and the benefits to the individual are
sufficiently large. See Tom Beauchamp, The Principle of Beneficence in Applied Ethics,
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
principle-beneficence/.
4. Extreme risk protection orders, familiarly known as "red flag laws," have been
enacted in 17 states as of September 2019. While the details differ from state to state,
they generally provide for the possibility of family members and law enforcement
officers to petition a court for an order to temporarily remove guns from the possession
of a person who appears to be an immediate threat to him- or herself, or to others. A
national survey in July, 2019 found that 77% of the adult public supported adoption of
such a law. See Gun Survey, APM RESEARCH LABS, https://www.apmresearchlab.org/
gunsurvey (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
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consensus, as, for example, with the evolving laws governing
marijuana and gambling. Professor Kim's new book provides a
thorough account of the scholarly debate about the relevant
principles and the application of these principles, with a variety of
interesting examples.
In particular, Kim focuses on what she considers the "hard
cases" for consentability. She identifies three categories of "hard
cases": self-directed activities, novel high-risk activities, and
"bodily integrity exchanges."5  The first category, self-directed
activities, are those "undertaken by an individual upon his own
initiative and control."6  This category includes "self-harming"
activities such as suicide; "self-improvement" activities that pose
some health risk such as cosmetic surgery, tattoos, and voluntary
amputation; and activities such as smoking tobacco, drinking
alcohol, and using recreational drugs that are intended neither for
self-harm nor self-improvement, but that carry risk for the
individual participant.7 The second category, novel high-risk
activities, includes new and unusual undertakings like travel to
Mars and participating in some experimental studies.8
It is the third category of "bodily integrity exchanges" that is
the focus of our comments here. Kim defines this category to
include commercial surrogacy, as well as payment for donating a
kidney or ova-topics about which we have previously written in
some detail.9 She reviews most of the reputable arguments, and
despite serious concerns, reaches a positive conclusion-that hese
exchanges should be viewed as "consentable" with certain
provisos.10 We agree with that conclusion but disagree about the
specific provisos. Her core concern is that some people, due to their
"desperate" poverty, will be tempted by an offer of a substantial
cash payment when it is not in their true self-interest to do so." In
our view, her proposal to require special screening for potential
5. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 18 (2019).
6. Id. at 19.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 44.
9. See, e.g., Philip J. Cook & Kimberly D. Krawiec, A primer on kidney
transplantation: anatomy of the shortage, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2014); Philip
J. Cook & Kimberly D. Krawiec, If We Allow Football Players and Boxers to Be Paid
for Entertaining the Public, Why Don't We Allow Kidney Donors to Be Paid for Saving
Lives, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (2018); Kimberly D Krawiec,, Lessons from Law
About Incomplete Commodification in the Egg Market, 33.2 J. APPL. PHILOS., 160-177
(2016).
10. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 32-44 (2019).
11. Id. at 198-99.
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donors who are poor is problematic. An alternative, which we
think would be salutary generally (not just for the poor) is to
structure the payout so that potential donors are not confronted by
the temptation of an immediate windfall gain in exchange for
undergoing the risky procedure of donation. Behavioral science
offers guidance on how to structure the payment to encourage
better decisions.
For the particular case of payment for kidney donation by a
living donor, we offer two additional suggestions, both intended to
draw on a different intuition by refraining the argument. Our first
suggestion is to consider kidney donation in the context of a wide
array of risky but productive tasks. Our goal is to encourage a
conversation about kidney donation that is not tainted by specific
concerns associated with sex work and surrogacy. Lumberjacks,
deep-sea fishermen, and some athletes place their bodies at
considerable risk in exchange for a premium wage, doing work that
(unlike sex work) is generally recognized as valuable and
unproblematic aside from the physical risk. We believe that
viewing the issue of consentability for paid kidney donation as
analogous to the issue of consentability for working on a fishing
boat clarifies the key issue relevant to consent. When Kim instead
associates it with sex work and surrogacy, the result is to raise
specific ethical concerns and distracting visceral responses.
A second and more radical refraining is to suggest a different
starting point for the evaluation of paid kidney donation. There are
some commentators who suggest that kidney donation is a duty for
those who are healthy-much like serving in the military during
time of war.12 After all, thousands of people are dying from renal
failure every year for want of kidney donors.13 The issue of consent
is transformed in this framing; the relevant question is not who
should be allowed to consent to donate a kidney, but rather who
12. See C6cile Fabre, Justice and the Compulsory Taking of Live Body Parts, 15
UTILITAS 127, 127-150 (2003) (arguing that the sick sometimes have a moral claim on
the body parts of the living); Julian Savulescu, Peter Singer & William Isdale, We Have
a Moral Obligation to Donate Organs, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Aug. 24, 2015),
https://www. smh.com. au/opinion/australias-poor-organ-donation-rate-costing-lives-
2 0
150824-gj60ov.html (arguing that there is a moral duty to donate one's organs after
death); see also CtCILE FABRE, WHOSE BODY IS IT ANYWAY?: JUSTICE AND THE
INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON (2006) (arguing that the sick may have a moral claim on
the body parts of the living).
13. Transplant Trends, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING,
https://unos.org/data/transplant-trends/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2019) (In 2017, more
than 6,500 people died while awaiting a transplant or within thirty days after being
removed from the transplant waitlist because they were too ill to be transplanted).
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should be allowed to opt out of the duty to donate a kidney. While
we do not endorse this framing, we believe that it is useful as a
reminder that the stakes in recruiting enough donors are very
high.
II. BODILY INTEGRITY EXCHANGES
Bodily integrity exchanges are "highly controversial because
they involve monetary payment for the use or possession of a part
of the human body."" Included in this category are "sex
work/prostitution, the selling of kidneys, and reproductive
services."1 5 Kim correctly notes that it is not the riskiness of these
activities that render them controversial. Though each involves
some level of risk, that risk is generally viewed as acceptable in the
absence of payment.16 Kidney donors are heroes, and sex in the
absence of payment is considered a normal part of romantic
relations.
Professor Kim details a number of arguments typically raised
against these "noxious" or "repugnant" transactions." One of the
most common objections is that such transactions commodify and
thus degrade the human body and social relations more
generally.18 Kim appears skeptical of this argument, correctly
pointing out the myriad situations in which we accept the bodily
commodification and even outright degradation of particular
groups, especially women. Says Kim:
Many societies thrive upon the commodification of the (female)
body, and permit payment to alter the natural state of that
body through cosmetic procedures, including risky and
invasive surgeries. Why should a woman be permitted to pay
someone to perform medically unnecessary surgical
procedures and prohibit that same women [sic] from getting
paid to undergo arguably less risky and invasive acts such as
surrogacy or egg extractions?19




18. Id. at 33; MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN'T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS
OF MARKETS (2012) (arguing that the social meaning of certain items and activities
are corrupted by the marketplace).
19. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 34 (2019).
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Kim appears to take more seriously a second objection, which
is that bodily integrity transactions "exploit the poor and promote
inequality."20 Kim hypothesizes that because it is "highly unlikely
that wealthy people will be selling their kidneys or other organs,"
bodily integrity transactions "would likely exacerbate the
unfairness and stratification in a society that values both justice
and equality."2 1
After weighing the various arguments, Kim ultimately rejects
a ban on legalized markets in bodily integrity transactions,
proposing instead a "presumption of defective consent" in bodily
integrity exchanges involving the "desperately poor."22 Although
we agree with many of Kim's recommendations, particularly those
designed to improve the consent process and overcome short-
sighted or uninformed decision-making, we also question some of
her assumptions regarding bodily integrity exchanges and
decision-making by the poor more generally.
Kim would permit bodily integrity markets, subject to some
limitations. Although no one is prohibited from participating in
bodily integrity exchanges, Kim is specifically concerned about the
"desperately poor" and their consent to such exchanges is
presumed defective. Those seeking to transact with the
desperately poor in a bodily integrity exchange would have to prove
that the interaction was originated by the desperately poor person
and that the terms of the exchange are fair and not exploitative.
2 3
We agree with Kim that legal rules should seek to ensure that risky
transactions are fair and undertaken on an informed basis. But
we resist the idea of differential review for those who are
"desperately" poor by some, inevitably arbitrary, standard.
Instead, our emphasis has been on how payments could be
structured to minimize the possibility of impulsive sales.
24 As with
removing the gun from the hands of the suicidal college student,
we believe that decisions of this sort should require a chance for
reflection.
Kim acknowledges the definitional difficulties in determining
who is desperately poor but proposes, as one possibility, an income
20. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 35 (2019).
21. Id. at 37.
22. Id. at 200.
23. Id.
24. Philip J. Cook & Kimberly D. Krawiec, If We Allow Football Players and Boxers
to be Paid for Entertaining the Public, Why Don't We Allow Kidney Donors to be Paid
for Saving Lives?, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 29-32 (2018).
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test that would categorize those at a certain percentage below the
poverty line as desperately poor.25 To be sure, in some markets in
some places donors living below the poverty line are active
participants in some types of bodily integrity exchanges. For
example, in Iran, the only country in the world to legalize organ
markets, one study found that 62% of living unrelated donors had
incomes below the poverty line.26 But because of consumer interest
(some would say obsession) with egg donor traits such as
education, IQ, and athletic ability, egg donors in the United States
have significantly higher educational levels (a common though
imperfect proxy for socio-economic status) than the general
population.2" This feature of the market, of course, has not
eliminated claims by market critics that egg donors are financially
coerced and exploited.28
Kim's proposed income definition would fail to address other
forms of financial distress that might influence or impair decision-
making, including indebtedness (many egg donors are students) or
financial setbacks. In other words, the promised compensation
from a bodily integrity exchange may be a significant lure for a
wide array of people of limited means, which is to say most adults
in the age range where they would qualify as medically attractive
donors. The chance to make, say, $50,000 by donating a kidney,
should that be legalized, would have broad appeal. And it should
be noted that this payment may help donors accomplish their
purpose by providing them with the wherewithal to eliminate
financial barriers to moving on with their lives, potentially
enhancing economic mobility. The point is that there should be no
presumption that it is a mistake for someone of limited means to
donate, nor that it reinforces societal stratification. Even if Kim is
correct that the poor are disproportionately likely to be the
suppliers of kidneys in a paid system (as is true in a variety of
occupations, risky or otherwise), the poor would also
25. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 198 (2019).
26. T. Malakoutian et al., Socioeconomic Status of Iranian Living Unrelated Kidney
Donors: A Multicenter Study, 39 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 824, 824 (2007).
27. Cynthia R. Daniels & Erin Heidt-Forsythe, Gendered Eugenics and the
Problematic of Free Market Reproductive Technologies: Sperm and Egg Donation in
the United States, 37 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOc'Y 719, 731-32 (2012) (finding
that egg donors were more than twice as likely as the general population to have
earned a college degree and that 100% of egg donors in a more than 350 person sample
had finished high school).
28. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Sunny Samaritans and Egomaniacs: Price-Fixing in
the Gamete Parket, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 59 (2009) (summarizing these
arguments).
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disproportionately benefit from a public system that compensates
donors and distributes kidneys according to medical need, because
the poor are also more likely to suffer from end stage renal
disease.29
In our view, the problem is not that people of limited means
would greatly increase their rate of kidney donation in response to
an offer of substantial payment. That is an inevitable part of the
solution to the kidney shortage. The problem is that if the offer
were made in the form of a lump sum to be paid immediately when
someone volunteered, then it would be too much of a temptation
for some potential donors, poor and middle class alike, who would
go on to subsequently regret their decision. Consent for such a
momentous decision should follow careful reflection-as in
Psychologist (and Nobel Laureate) Daniel Kahneman's famous
term "system 2 thinking," which in contrast to the quick, impulsive
judgments of system 1 thinking, is instead slow, analytical, and
effortful.30 Of particular concern is taking the time to reduce
"optimism bias," the general tendency in evaluating a course of
action (such as renovating a kitchen) to overestimate benefits and
underestimate costs.31 To reduce the allure of jackpot earnings and
encourage due reflection, the contract for a volunteer kidney donor
could delay any payment until after a period of medical and
mental-health screening and consultation, and whatever delays
before the kidney is needed. Another possibility would be to make
the payment over a period of years, in the form of an annuity. The
goal of structured payments is to complement the screening and
counseling process to reduce the chance that donors would act
impulsively and have unrealistic expectations.
III. FINDING THE RIGHT FRAME FOR KIDNEY
DONATION
Professor Kim assigns kidney and egg donation to the same
category as prostitution and surrogacy, under the umbrella of
"bodily integrity exchanges." While that is reasonable up to a
point, we are concerned that placing organ donation in such
company will prejudice judgment about how it should be regulated.
29. Philip J. Held et al., Would Government Compensation of Living Kidney Donors
Exploit the Poor? An Empirical Analysis, PLOS ONE (2018), available at https://
doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0205655.
30. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW, Part I (Farrar, Strauss,
and Gireau, 2011) (explaining the two systems in which the brain forms thoughts).
31. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW, Part II (Farrar, Strauss,
and Gireau, 2011) (explaining the phenomenon of human thinking using heuristics).
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Sex work in particular raises ethical concerns that are not a part
of organ donation. While kidney donors are heroic, that term is
rarely applied to sex workers, even by those (including us) who do
not object to their profession.
Currently, and unfortunately, the "heroic" label is largely
reserved for unpaid kidney donors. Anthropologists have found
that paid donors, in contrast, are generally considered victims (as
they often are in the black market) or are socially stigmatized.32
But we think it likely that under an appropriately regulated
system paid kidney donors will come to be regarded much as paid
military members are today-as heroes who are compensated for
their time, effort, and sacrifice. The social framing of the act may
be important in this effort, as it is in legitimizing the ova market,
where gift framing is prominent.33 Some research, for example,
suggests that "heroism awards" are more politically palatable than
framing donor compensation as a financial inducement.3 4
An alternative and less loaded category in which to consider
organ donation is that of risky occupations. Workers such as
lumberjacks, crew on deep-sea fishing boats, and structural steel
workers face a very high risk of injury.3 5 There is no question that
they are doing useful work that contributes to our standard of
living, and no concerted objection to the practice of allowing people
to volunteer for such jobs-which typically pay a premium
compared to what they could make otherwise. Many of the workers
in such occupations come from poor households and communities
and lack much education. The analogy to compensated kidney
donation (another productive activity, should it be legalized) seems
clear, and an analysis of consentability should reach the same
conclusion.
32. See, e.g., Farhat Moazam, Riffat Moazam Zaman, & Aamir M. Jafarey,
Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic Study, 39 HASTINGS
CTR. REP. 29 (2009); Javaad Zargooshi, Quality of Life of Iranian Kidney "Donors",
166.5 J. UROLOGY 1790 (2001).
33. RENE ALMELING, SEX CELLS: THE MEDICAL MARKET FOR EGGS AND SPERM
(2011); Krawiec, supra note 28.
34. See Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, Philanthropically Funded Heroism
Awards for Kidney Donors, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131 (2014).
35. Michael B. Sauter & Charles Stockdale, The Most Dangerous Jobs in the US
Include Electricians, Firefighters and Police Officers, USA TODAY (Jan. 8, 2019),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/01/08/most-dangerous-jobs-us-where-fat
al-injuries-happen-most-often/38832907/ (rankings based on 2018 data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics' annual National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries
Report).
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A more radical reframing of kidney donation is to change the
focus from the potential donors to the renal-failure patients for
whom a new kidney would extend their life by years and reduce
the disability associated with renal dialysis. Federal law bans
offering payment to donors, and while 6,000 living donors are
found each year (almost always to donate to a family member or
friend), the result of banning compensation is a massive shortage
amounting to 15,000-20,000 kidneys per year.36 Any adult in good
health under age sixty-five with two kidneys is in a position to
donate, since the second kidney is entirely redundant in bodily
functioning. The operation is by no means trivial and creates some
medical risk both during and after, not to mention substantial
discomfort during the healing process. But the great majority of
donors are fully recovered within a few months. In previous work,
we compared kidney donation with playing professional football;
3 7
the evidence is clear that football carries far more risk to long-term
health and functioning. Given that kidney donation is an option
for most adults in a medical sense, there is a case to be made that
it is also a duty.3 8 If we have a reasonable chance to save a fellow
human, is there then an obligation to do so? Such an obligation is
not built into the law-there is no general "duty to rescue" in
United States law or that of most other countries-but has been
seen by some commentators as an ethical duty.39 We do not
endorse that position but find it interesting as an alternative to the
focus generally found in the literature (and Professor Kim's book)
on the welfare of the potential donor. The welfare of the renal
patient could be made integral to the analysis. The concern that
paying donors would somehow devalue their contribution by
making the donated kidney into a "commodity" would be trumped
by a realization that the ban on payment has the effect of causing
36. See Philip J. Cook & Kimberly D. Krawiec, If We Allow Football Players and
Boxers to be Paid for Entertaining the Public, Why Don't We Allow Kidney Donors to be
Paid for Saving Lives?, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (2018).
37. See id.
38. See Cecile Fabre, Justice and the Compulsory Taking of Live Body Parts, 15
UTILITAS 127, 127-150 (2003) (arguing that the sick sometimes have a moral claim on
the body parts of the living); Julian Savulescu, Peter Singer & William Isdale, We Have
a Moral Obligation to Donate Organs, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Aug. 24, 2015),
https://www. smh.com. au/opinion/australias-poor-organ-donation-rate-costing-lives-
20150824-gj60ov.html (arguing that there is a moral duty to donate one's organs after
death); see also CtcILE FABRE, WHOSE BODY IS IT ANYWAY?: JUSTICE AND THE
INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON (2006) (arguing that the sick may have a moral claim on
the body parts of the living).
39. See David A. Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the
Duty to Rescue, 84 TEX. L. REV. 653, 653 (2006).
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thousands of deaths and much unnecessary suffering. The concern
that low-income donors would in some sense find the offer of
payment too attractive could be balanced against a realization that
their action, even if ill-considered, would likely save a life and
deserves compensation.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Consentability, Nancy Kim tackles an important and
current topic-in an age of increasing options about how to live,
die, and procreate, what limits, if any, should the law place on
those choices? Consentability is a valuable resource for scholars
and policymakers alike, summarizing the arguments for and
against government intrusion on the choices of consenting adults
with encyclopedic thoroughness. After weighing the arguments,
Kim proposes that "bodily integrity exchanges" be permitted,
subject to limitations. Although we agree with the general
conclusion that bodily integrity exchanges should be permitted, we
disagree with the specific limitations that treat the decisions of the
poor as suspect, proposing instead methods of structuring
payments and the consent process that would enhance the
decision-making quality and reduce the possibility of impulsive
decisions for all donors-not just those meeting an arbitrary
definition of poverty. In any event, when it comes to a life-saving
transaction like kidney donation, it is ethically important to
consider the welfare of the recipient as well as the donor.
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